As the authors are analyzing the institutional design pre-set by the 1993 Constitution they are right away applying the results to the task of clearing up the role of the “power parties” in the Russian political system. They proceed from the presumption of rationality of political actors’ behaviour within the framework established by the existing institutional limitations. A “power party” is comprehended as a strategy preconditioned by the need of the elites having no experience of taking part in elections, to adapt themselves to new institutional conditions. Particular features of the Russian institutional design are analyzed from the angle of the stimuli and limitations they create for the emergence of a “power party”. After the authors have demonstrated rationality of a strategy aimed at the creation of a parliamentary majority apt to render full support to the course pursued by the President, they proceed to investigating (a) the possibilities of realizing this strategy through the creation of a “power party” and (b) eventual obstacles in the way of its realization. The cardinal result obtained in the long run is a theoretical model explaining the reasons for the formation of “power parties” at the all-Russian level.