The Right to Lie as a Trap for Freedom

A.G. Myasnikov

doi:10.17976/jpps/2017.05.12

The Right to Lie as a Trap for Freedom

Myasnikov A.G.,

Dr. Sci. (Philos.), Professor, Department for Methodologies of Science, Social Theories and Technologies, Penza State University, Penza, myasnikov-g@mail.ru

elibrary_id: 391404 |

DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2017.05.12

Rubric: Laboratory

For citation:

Myasnikov A.G. The Right to Lie as a Trap for Freedom. – Polis. Political Studies. 2017. No. 5. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2017.05.12

Abstract

The article deals with the urgent moral and legal problem of the right for a lie in a new world outlook context namely as a trap for human freedom. The presented author’s interpretation of degrees of freedom as stages of development of independence of the person gives a social and ethical assessment of a practical phenomenon of the right for a lie. The author analyses various negative aspects of application of this phenomenon in modern public life and shows essential restrictions which people face with when they use the right for a lie. This analysis is based on theoretical model of the matrix of traditional consciousness assuming three-level structure of the public relations. It is under construction from the first – the ideological level of the highest (moral and religious) meanings, to the second level – political and legal rules and installations, and then to the third level – social and economic and psychological practices of behavior. The author revealed negative aspects of use of the right for a lie at the second and third levels of a matrix. At the second level subordinated to the principle “the end justifies the means” negative consequences will be: paternalism, moral utopianism and legal nihilism. At the third level – mass falsity, mistrust, unsociability and social apathy will belong to the public risks connected with use of the right for a lie. Thus, the right for a lie keeps human freedom at the level of social and biological survival and interferes with transition of the person and society to higher degrees of freedom independence. For transition to new degrees of freedom it is necessary to establish, first, an origin and borders of use of the right for a lie, namely its need and efficiency only in extreme conditions of survival of the person and society (usually, in military conditions). Upon transition of society to peaceful, safe life “the right for a lie” turns into a dangerous stereotype, into the real trap for practical mind which constrains development of human freedom. Secondly, in modern peace conditions it is necessary to limit by law use of the right for a lie by strict and specific conditions of public safety and a narrow circle of public officials. Under these conditions the possibility of further democratic development of all society, and bigger free self-realization of citizens remains.

Keywords

right for a lie; freedom; degrees of independence; Kant; trap for freedom; stereotype; public risks.

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Content No. 5, 2017