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Climate, nuclear weapons control and cyber threats:
three problems or one?

Sevostyanov P.I. ,

Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow, Russia, Sevostyanov.PI@rea.ru

elibrary_id: 431654 | ORCID: 0009-0004-5773-773X | RESEARCHER_ID: ADX-9355-2022

Mizin V.I.,

Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, mizin56@hotmail.com

elibrary_id: 383265 | ORCID: 0000-0001-7903-4454 | RESEARCHER_ID: D-9531-2017

Article received: 2023.09.22. Accepted: 2024.02.09


DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2024.03.03
EDN: KZIECH

Rubric: Theme of the issue: New faces of global politics

For citation:

Sevostyanov P.I. , Mizin V.I. Climate, nuclear weapons control and cyber threats: three problems or one? – Polis. Political Studies. 2024. No. 3. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.03.03. EDN: KZIECH

Abstract

The article analyzes a set of problems related to the mutual influence of three global challenges of our time, which will determine the configuration of modern society in the medium and long term: climate change, nuclear arms control and cyber threats. The study reveals the role of each of the components and the prospects for their transformation for Russia, the United States and European states. Priority scenarios of state policy within the framework of nuclear deterrence and information security are substantiated. The experience of recent decades reveals that the rejection of security treaties, as a rule, weakens the security of States, rather than strengthens it. Thus, in the course of the study, strategic objectives, the content side and policy options of the Russian Federation in the current international situation were considered, conclusions were drawn regarding the optimality of the chosen strategies for interaction with European partners in the field of arms control, the climate agenda and cyber threats. The authors conclude that it is necessary to create a new generation security architecture through informal consultations on strategic stability, which determine the negotiation plan to be discussed at official negotiations between Russia and the United States. In addition, the authors prove that in the foreseeable future, climate change will have a negative impact on the activities of armies and increase the frequency of their deployment in crisis situations. For this reason, competitive advantages in the defense sector will be determined by the ability of the command to adapt to climate change,reduce damage to military infrastructure and minimise the risks of resource losses due to natural disasters and extreme weather conditions.

Keywords

cyberwar, arms control, strategic stability, climate change, nuclear weapons, global security, strategic balance.

 Full Text

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