It is analysis of particular features of the formation and realization of Russia’s policy towards Ukraine that is essayed in the article. In the author’s conclusion, the Moscow political technologists who were taking an active part in the elaboration of the Kremlin’s policy regarding “the Ukrainian question”, overlooked the presence of a classical revolutionary situation in Ukraine, with all its attributes. Having disregarded revolutionary movement as a political infinitesimal whose interests need not be taken into account, Russia acted in defiance of it in the role historically habitual for her, of a European gendarme. A real policy was substituted for by a set of tricks that had shown themselves to advantage in the epoch of “the second stagnation” which had begun in the country in 1994 to 1995. But, as is proved in the article, an immutable condition of effectiveness of such kind of tricks is that multitude lack its own position and lack the desire to interfere into the elites’ fight. Ukraine gives an object-lesson of what is apt to befall political technologies when stagnation is superseded by a revolution.