Political institutions, efficiency and deprivation:
essay of analogue computation
Akhremenko A.S.,
Dr. Sci. (Polit. Sci.), Professor, Senior Researcher, Laboratory for political and psychological research, HSE University, Moscow, Russia, aakhremenko@hse.ru
elibrary_id: 124097 | ORCID: 0000-0001-8002-7307 | RESEARCHER_ID: L-3000-2015
Petrov A.P.,
Dr. Sci. (Applied Math.), Senior Researcher, Keldysh Institute for Applied Mathematics (Russian Academy of Science), petrov.alexander.p@yandex.ru
elibrary_id: 15671 | ORCID: 0000-0001-5244-8286 | RESEARCHER_ID: R-6729-2016
Akhremenko A.S., Petrov A.P. Political institutions, efficiency and deprivation: essay of analogue computation. – Polis. Political Studies. 2012. No. 6
A mathematical model of the processes of personnel selection and of resources distribution has been constructed by the authors and is presented in this article of theirs. The said processes are regulated by a set of political rules (institutions) manifestly designated as mathematical functions. Most important characteristics of the model are: deprivation (individual and joint), efficiency, and distribution of political influence between individuals. All the adduced concepts are defined in the article both substantially and formally. Analyzed in the article, for one thing, is the influence of the politico-institutional structure on the level of the efficiency of the system and on the summary deprivation level of the individuals constituting it. Secondly, considered in the article are the stimuli of individual political behavior, as they are produced by different systems of personnel selection rules.