In his study of the voter’s behaviour, the author relies on the scheme of a rational citizen, suggested by J.Buchanan and G.Tullock. The voter’s choice of this or that strategy of behaviour depends on what, for him, the worth of the elections is. If the worth is high, the voter will behave like a depositor who counts on receiving appreciable dividends in the future as a result of his investing his vote at the moment. If, however, the worth of the elections is low, the depositor’s behaviour becomes like that of a vendor who seeks to profitably sell his vote and to minimize, as far as possible, whatever waste the elections are attended by. In its turn, the voter’s estimation of the worth of the elections depends on his trust in the power in general and in the institution of elections in particular. Depending on the rational voter’s behaviour, the candidates for the organs of representative power resort to different strategies in election campaigns.