The article analytically retraces discussions that have been developing in recent decades in foreign and Russian science, a propos of the concept of “essential contestability” of political notions. The author demonstrates that the collision between the arguments “for” and those adduced “against” the concept in question, is partly accounted for by the differences in the conceptual apparatus applied: thus, in situations where the partisans of the concept observe competitive interpretations of one notion, its opponents perceive different notions. As for the presence of normative elements in the content of the notions, the difficulties following therefrom, the author concludes, should not be exaggerated: differences of philosophical, theoretical-methodological and ideological orientations do not exclude the possibility (1) of comprehending the point of an alternative concept (otherwise there wouldn’t be any normal scientific and political communication) and (2) of effective conceptual discussions, of achieving progress in the study of political notions.